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Protecting Due Process During Terrorism 
Adjudications: Redefining “Crimes Against 
Humanity” And Eliminating The Doctrine Of 
Complimentary Jurisdiction In Favor Of The 
International Criminal Court 
Daniel N. Clay 
“When we sit in judgment we are holding ourselves out as 
people—as the kind of a community—that are worthy of this task.  
It is the seriousness, the gravity, of the act of judgment which 
gives rise to our legitimate and laudable emphasis on procedural 
fairness and substantive accuracy in criminal procedure.  But 
these things focus on the defendant—the one judged.  I am 
concerned about us who would presume to sit in judgment.  Who 
are we that we should do this? Whether we intend to do so or not, 
we answer this question in part through the way we conduct our 
trials.”1 
 Prof. Daniel N. Clay is currently a Tenure-Track Assistant Professor at Elmira College, 
Division of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Departments of Criminal Justice and Legal 
Studies.  He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Criminology and Political Science from Drury 
University (2011), a Master of Science in Crime and Justice Studies from Suffolk University 
(2015), a Juris Doctor from Suffolk University Law School (2015), and a Master of Laws in 
International Criminal Law and Justice from the University Of New Hampshire School Of 
Law (2016).  Prior to Dr. Clay’s first academic appointment at the University of Alabama, 
his legal career included a position with the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit (J. Torruella) who aided in the dissenting opinion in In Re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d 14 (1st 
Cir. 2015).  In addition to his present academic duties and scholarship on international and 
domestic criminal law, Dr. Clay serves on the Board of Directors of an innovative, free online 
legal research platform targeting United States federal law. 
1. SHERMAN J. CLARK, THE TRIAL ON TRIAL, VOLUME 2: JUDGMENT AND CALLING 
TO ACCOUNT 85 (R.A. Duff, et al. eds., 2006). 
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INTRODUCTION 
A. THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING
On April 15, 2013, at approximately 2:49 p.m., two 
homemade bombs made from pressure-cookers, packed with 
shrapnel, and hidden in backpacks exploded within feet of the 
finishing-line of the Boston Marathon – killing three and 
wounding more than 260 others.1  A four-day manhunt for the 
perpetrators of the bombing, involving over “1000 federal, state 
and local law enforcement” officers, then ensued.2  Three days 
later, on April 18, 2013, authorities identified two brothers, 
Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, as suspects in the attacks.3  
Following their identification, the brothers attempted to flee the 
city as police gave chase.4  In the small Boston suburb of 
Watertown, Massachusetts, the chase ended in a shootout with 
police in which one of the suspects, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, was 
killed and the other suspect, Dzhokar Tsarnaev, escaped.5 
The morning following the escape of Dzhokar Tsarnaev, 
April 19, 2013, the Governor of Massachusetts, in what the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit would later 
call “an unprecedented move,” issued a “shelter-in-place”6 order 
for Boston-proper and the surrounding areas, including 
1. A&E Networks, Boston Marathon Bombing, HISTORY.COM, https:// www.history.
com/ topics/ boston- marathon- bombings [https://perma.cc/3WX8-LMLV] (summarizing 
the events of the Boston Marathon bombing and the subsequent manhunt). 
2. Id.; In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d 14, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2015) (J. Torruella dissenting)
(denying Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s first petition for a writ of mandamus ordering a change of 
venue).   
3. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 30.
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6.  When a “shelter-in-place” order is issued government officials have determined that
the “best place to be safe [from a known threat] is indoors.”  Daily Bulletin, There are the 
Terms You Need to Know in the Event of a Disaster, DailyBulletin.com, 
https://www.dailybulletin.com/ 2016/ 03/ 17/ there- are- the- terms- you- need-to-know-in-
the-event-of-a-disaster/ [https://perma.cc/47KX-7P9Z].  During the course of the “shelter-
in-place,” residents are instructed to “turn off air-conditioner and fan units, seal the gaps 
around windows and doors, and listen to the radio for authorities to announce the threat has 
passed.”  Id.  Further, residents are warned: “Do not venture out of your shelter until you are 
instructed it is safe to do so.”  Id.  
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Watertown, effective at 5:45am.7  As a part of the order, citizens 
were confined8 to their homes while Specialized Weapons and 
Tactics (“SWAT”) teams were deployed to conduct house-to-
house searches for the suspects within a secured perimeter around 
Watertown.9  As the searches began, one resident described her 
reaction: “I was more scared of them than anything else . . . 
[t]hese were big men in black with guns [, searching while] I had
a 9-year-old hiding under the covers. . . . I have never felt so
powerless in my own home.”10  However, largely due to media
coverage, this fear was not localized to Watertown; instead, by
that morning, it had already spread across the nation.11
B. TRIAL IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION
Immediately following the first bomb blast on April 15, 
2013, until Dzhokar Tsarnaev surrendered on April 19, 2013, 
national news organizations descended upon Boston and began 
providing “nonstop coverage and live updates” of the bombing, 
the ensuing manhunt for Dzhokar Tsarnaev, and the door-to-door 
7. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 30-31. The order extended to Newton, Waltham,
Cambridge, Boston, and the entire MBTA (subway, commuter rail, and bus) systems.  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY, AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR THE 
RESPONSE TO THE 2013 BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS 7 (2014), 
https://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/mema/after-action-report-for-the-response-to-the-2013-
boston-marathon-bombings.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5WY-94MA]. 
8. Reports following the shelter-in-place concluded that the order was precautionary
rather than mandatory.  Associated Press, Massachusetts Gov. Deval Patrick: Closing City 
Amid Hunt for Boston Marathon Bomber ‘Tough,’ MASSLIVE, 
http://www.masslive.com/news/boston/index.ssf/2014/04/massachusetts_governor_deval_p
.html [https://perma.cc/WZ2B-JDQZ].‘’  However, despite subsequent reports noting the 
order was merely precautionary, most citizens obeyed the order believing they did not have 
a choice.  Id.  
9. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY, supra note 8, at 7.  The
legality of the searches have since been hotly contested, yet no formal challenges have 
succeeded to-date.  National Lawyers Guild Massachusetts Chapter, Were the Watertown 
Lockdowns Lawful?, MASS DISSENT (Mar. 31, 2015), http:// www.nlgmasslawyers.org 
/were-the-watertown-lockdowns-lawful/ [ https://perma.cc/XS35-P7V3]. 




11. Teresa Welsh, Did the Media Botch the Boston Bombing?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT (Apr. 19, 2013), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/04/19/has-media-
coverage-of-boston-marathon-bombings-been-responsible [https://perma.cc/3WN5-F3B5]. 
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searches in Watertown.12  Despite numerous instances of 
misinformation motivated by the pressures of the twenty-four 
hour news cycle, viewership on the major cable news networks 
increased dramatically during the live coverage.13  Specifically, 
following the attack, Cable News Network’s (“CNN”) audience 
increased by a staggering 194%, averaging 1.2 million viewers at 
any given time during daytime hours of the coverage.14  Similarly, 
Fox News Channel (“FOX”) increased by 48% to an average of 
1.6 million daytime viewers.15  Combined, CNN, FOX, and 
MSNBC broadcast live updates to an average of 3.5 million 
viewers during the day and approximately 8 million views during 
primetime.16  However, these averages pale in comparison to the 
combined reach of other media sources, such as the broadcast 
networks (i.e. ABC, NBC, CBS, etc), non-traditional televised 
programs (i.e. Jon Stewart), news blogs (i.e. CNN.com), social 
media (i.e. Twitter), independent websites, etc.17  In other words, 
within four days following the first bomb blast, most people in 
the United States had engaged with at least one news report 
regarding the bombing via some form of media source.18 
Following Dzhokar Tsarnaev’s surrender, national media 
coverage began to slowly dissipate as the public seemingly lost 
interest or was no longer in need of the reassurance and comfort 
provided by obsessive media coverage.19  However, new research 
conducted at the University of California at Irving related to 
Boston Marathon bombings suggests that engagement with media 
coverage during a terrorist attack or mass-shooting may: (1) cause 
acute stress symptoms greater than those who were at or near the 
12. Id. 
13. Lisa Richwine, Despite Error, CNN Gets Ratings Boost From Boston Bombing, 
Trails Fox, REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2013, 6:05 PM), https:// www.reuters.com/ article/ 
entertainment- us- usa- explosions- boston- m-idUSBRE93I1B320130419 
[https://perma.cc/9D43-24KM]. 
14. Id.  CNN’s primetime viewership peaked at 2.75 million viewers.  Michael
O’Connell, TV Ratings: Viewership Surges During Cable News Coverage of Boston 
Marathon Bombing, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 16, 2013), https:// 
www.hollywoodreporter.com/ live-feed/ tv- ratings- viewership- surges- cable- 440488 
[https://perma.cc/X4BZ-63VY]. 
15. Richwine, supra note 14.
16. O’Connell, supra note 15.
17. See In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 41.
18. See O’Connell, supra note 15.
19. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 48.
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actual attack; (2) trigger flashbacks to different attacks or the 
same attack later in life; (3) encourage subconscious fear 
conditioning; and (4) result in chronic stress about the event from 
repeated exposure.20  Specifically, the study found that “exposure 
to media coverage of the Boston Marathon bombings in the week 
afterward was linked to more [emotional harm] than having been 
at or near the marathon, even if the stress was not immediately 
apparent.”21  In other words, engaging with tragic events, such as 
the Boston Marathon bombing, via the media may result in 
secondary victimization among a nation’s many viewers.22 
Further, engaging with these criminal acts via the media (i.e. 
pre-trial reporting or non-objective pre-trial publicity) 
statistically results in the cultivation of significant anti-defendant 
bias.23  More specifically, media reports present a very condensed 
(2-5 minute) recitation of the underlying “facts,” while 
emphasizing the most damaging evidence; thus, empowering the 
viewer to make a judgment based upon extremely limited 
information.24  Even the Supreme Court acknowledged this 
phenomena in Rideau v. Louisiana, holding: “‘[f]or anyone who 
has ever watched television[,] the conclusion cannot be avoided 
that this spectacle, to the tens of thousands of people who saw and 
heard it, in a very real sense’ was the actual trial.”25  Predictably, 
20. Prolonged Viewing of Boston Marathon Bombings Media Coverage Tied to Acute
Stress, UCI NEWS (Dec. 9, 2013), https:// news.uci.edu/ 2013/ 12/ 09/ prolonged-viewing- 
of- boston- marathon- bombings- media- coverage- tied- to-acute-stress/ 
[https://perma.cc/SG27-BB8M]. 
21. Id. 
22. See id. 
23. Lorraine Hope, et al., Understanding Pretrial Publicity Predecisional Distortion
of Evidence by Mock Jurors (2004), http://luna.cas.usf.edu/ ~ruva/ 
Psychology%26Law/Readings/Hope_Memon_Predecisional_Distortion.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UZ96-4PM7]; Cf. Jeffery R. Wilson & Brian H. Bornstein, Methodological 
Considerations in Pretrial Publicity Research: Is the Medium the Message?, 22 J. OF L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 585-97 (1998). “[T]he bulk of the literature [concludes] . . . PTP has a 
deleterious effect.”  Id. at 593.  But see Rob Tricchinelli, Pretrial Publicity’s Limited Effect 
on the Right to a Fair Trial, THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE LAW (Spring 2013), 
https://www.rcfp.org/ browse-media- law- resources/ news- media- law/ news- media- and- 
law- spring- 2013/pretrial-publicitys-limited#sthash.zysOBRRC.dpuf 
[https://perma.cc/N4DJ-G4QT]. 
24. Wilson & Bornstein, supra note 24, at 586, 593.
25. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 34 (quoting Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963)
(internal quotations omitted)). 
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this influence was felt as jury selection began in Dzhokar 
Tsarnaev’s trial.26 
C. DUE PROCESS & JURY SELECTION
On February 1, 2015, the 1,373 prospective jurors were 
summoned to the U.S. Federal Courthouse in Boston, 
Massachusetts to complete juror questionnaires before beginning 
the process of voir dire.27  Twenty-four days later, only seventy-
five jurors were provisionally qualified to the jury pool.28  Of the 
staggering number of jurors excluded from the pool, their juror 
questionnaires are telling of a significant anti-defendant bias in 
the Eastern Massachusetts venire (of which only 5% presumed 
Tsarnaev innocent); these are just a few of the sample responses 
to the questionnaire: “[h]e does not deserve a trial,” “[t]hey 
shouldn’t waste the [bullets] or poison; hang them,” “I have 
formed the opinion that a convicted terrorist should receive the 
death penalty. They’re the enemy of my country,” “[t]here was so 
much media coverage, even just the shootout in Watertown.  I 
watched it on TV. And so I feel like there’s involvement there, 
like I think it’s—anybody would think that,” etc.29  However, 
despite overwhelming evidence of significant anti-defendant bias 
within the venire, in two-to-one opinions, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit twice denied Tsarnaev’s petition 
for writ of mandamus seeking a change of venue outside of the 
Eastern District of Massachusetts.30 
Writing for the dissent in both opinions, Judge Juan 
Torruella argued, under the circumstances, the majority’s 
decision violated Tsarnaev’s constitutional right to a fair trial by 
a panel of impartial jurors because every juror within the Eastern 
Massachusetts venire had been significantly affected or 
victimized by the bombing.31  Specifically, Judge Torruella noted: 
[A] number of . . . residents were not at the Marathon,
did not know anyone at the Marathon, or were not
personally subject to the shelter-in-place order.  Still,
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 35.
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 35-37.  These excerpts are derived directly from J. Tourrella’s dissent.
30. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 16-17.
31. Id. at 44-45.
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they were nevertheless affected because the entire city 
of Boston was the intended victim of the bombings. 
That is the whole point of terrorism—not just to kill or 
injure a few innocent people, but to make everyone 
scared and make everyone believe it could have been 
them or that they could be next.32 
Based upon this reasoning, Judge Torruella advocated that the 
trial be moved outside of the Eastern District of Massachusetts 
and, preferably, the state; therein eliminating bias from the jury 
pool.33 
D. ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW
This analysis disagrees with Judge Torruella’s opinion in-
so-far as it implies a defendant charged with terrorism can receive 
an impartial jury in the country where the alleged attack occurred.  
More specifically, if “the whole point of terrorism [is]—not just 
to kill or injure a few innocent people, but to make everyone 
scared and make everyone believe it could have been them or that 
they could be next,”34 then, because everyone in a target country 
can be considered a victim (including prosecutors, judges, and 
jurors), venue cannot be properly maintained since victimization 
(primary or secondary) naturally creates bias.35  Instead, this 
analysis contends that venue for alleged acts of terrorism should 
properly lie with an independent international adjudicatory body 
such as the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).  However, 
presently, the ICC only assumes jurisdiction36 when a member 
32. Id. at 44.
33. See id. at 47-48.  To this end, Tsarnaev’s lawyers commissioned a survey of
potential jurors in Boston, Springfield, New York City and Washington D.C. to study relative 
prejudice.  WCVB, 58 Percent of Potential Jurors Say Bombing Suspect Guilty (June 19, 
2014), http:// www.wcvb.com/ news/ 58- percent- of- potential- jurors- say- bombing-
suspect-guilty/ 26564784 [https://perma.cc/9ZQ9-XEK4].  The survey found 57 percent of 
Bostonians, 47.9 percent of New York City residents, 51.7 percent of Springfield, 
Massachusetts, and 37.4 percent of Washington D.C. residents already believed Tsarnaev 
was “definitely guilty.”  Dennis Lynch, Boston Bombing Tsarnaev Trial: Most Prospective 
Jurors Believe Suspect Is Guilty, IBT (Jan. 22, 2015), http:// www.ibtimes.com/ boston-
bombing- tsarnaev- trial- most- prospective- jurors- believe- suspect- guilty- 1791570 
[https://perma.cc/9AMY-NQCR]. 
34. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 44.
35. Id. at 45.
36. “A government’s general power to exercise authority over all persons and things
within its territory.”  Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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State fails to initiate genuine prosecutions of war crimes, 
genocide, or crimes against humanity.37  Thus, to effectuate true 
due process (a fundamental human right), the ICC’s jurisdictional 
mandate should be extended to implicitly include acts of 
terrorism.  In advancing this position, this analysis will: (1) 
examine competing statutory definitions of “terrorism,” 
emphasizing the scope of civilian impact anticipated by statutes 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, India, Iraq, and the 
United Nations; (2) examine prevailing due process standards of 
impartiality and fairness juxtaposed to its application in terrorism 
proceedings; (3) examine current subject-matter jurisdiction 
limitations of the ICC in terrorism prosecutions; and (4) 
ultimately propose the Rome Statute’s definition of “crimes 
against humanity” be expanded to implicitly include “terrorism,” 
therein providing an impartial venue for terrorism prosecutions. 
II. THE FIRST CHALLENGE TO ICC
JURISDICTION: DEFINING “TERRORISM” 
Conceptually, terrorism has an ancient lineage tracing to the 
Assyrians in the 9th Century B.C.38  Over time, the concept has 
gone through many ideations, with most recent evolution 
reflecting a shift from ideological terrorism, which emerged in the 
1960s, to religious terrorism following the collapse of the 
Communist Bloc in the 1980s.39  More specifically, following the 
37. How the Court Works, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT https:// www.icc-cpi.int/ about/
how-the-court-works/Pages/default.aspx#legalProcess [https://perma.cc/7UKS-JF3Z]. 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court anticipates that the Court 
will acquire jurisdiction over “the crime of aggression” in the future. ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, Art. 5(1)(d)-(2), https://www.icc-cpi.int/ nr/ rdonlyres/ 
ea9aeff7- 5752- 4f84- be94- 0a655eb30e16/ 0/ rome_ statute_ english.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T4PX-2QX3] [hereinafter ROME STATUTE].  While the Assembly of States 
Parties have agreed that “a ‘crime of aggression’ means the planning, preparation, 
initiation[,] or execution of an act [(i.e. invasion, military occupation, annexation, etc.)] using 
armed forces by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity[,] or political 
independence of another State,” the Court may not begin exercising subject matter 
jurisdiction over the crime until after January 1, 2017 when the Amendment must be 
approved by a two-thirds majority of the States Parties to the Rome Statue and ratified by at 
least 30 States Parties. ICC, UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
https:// www.icc-cpi.int/ iccdocs/ pids/ publications/ uicceng.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A24-
SVXB]. 
38. HARRY R. DAMMER & JAY S. ALBANESE, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS 241 (5th ed., 2014). 
39. Id. at 242.
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Cold War, “certain states [(primarily in the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia)] [were left] in unstable or anarchic conditions, 
[which gave] impetus to the rise of new set of extremists whose 
ideology or motivations allow, or even call for [ ] indiscriminate 
targeting [of civilian populations].”40 
Yet, despite the rise of indiscriminate targeting of civilians 
following the Cold War and major attacks on “Western” cities 
(i.e. 9/11, the London Underground bombing, the Paris shootings, 
and the Belgium bombings), there remains no universally 
recognized definition of “terrorism.”41  As such, legal dictionaries 
generally adopt broad definitions of “terrorism,” to capture 
differing, modern conceptions of the term.42  Thus, definitionally, 
the term “terrorism” is most commonly interpreted by both States 
and tribunals through the lens of their respective experiences, 
cultures, and values.43 
However, while such flexibility may permit States to tailor 
definitions to specific threats, this lack of uniformity may be 
irreconcilable across borders and result in an “unmooring from 
[traditional] rule of law principles.”44  Specifically, given the 
flexibility of the term “terrorism,” states may adopt criminal 
codes that share “common core elements, such a condemnation of 
the purposeful killing of civilians,” however, ancillary elements 
in the definition (i.e. motivation) is largely based on each State’s 
own experience with terrorism.45  As such, to truly understand the 
definition of “terrorism,” one must examine its codification 
40. John Moore, The Evolution of Islamic Terrorism: An Overview, PBS: FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/ wgbh/ pages/ frontline/ shows/ target/ etc/ modern.html 
[https://perma.cc/LZV9-GXYN]. 
41. GRANT NIEMEN, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 176 (2014).
In part, this lack of a consist stems from Cold War sentiment that “one [man’s] terrorist is 
another [man’s] freedom fighter,” which, according the American Psychology Association, 
accurately defines the perspective that both victims and perpetrators adopt when confronted 
with a violent act.  Tori DeAngelis, Understanding Terrorism, 40 MONITOR ON 
PSYCHOLOGY 60, 60 (2009); Sudha Setty, What’s in a Name? How Nations Define 
Terrorism Ten Years After 9/11, 33 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 1, 7 (2011).  
42. For example, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “terrorism” extremely broadly as
“[t]he use or threat of violence to intimidate or cause panic, esp. as a means of achieving a 
political end.”  Terrorism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
43. Id. 
44. Setty, supra note 42, at 2 (discussing application of counterterrorism law in the
United States, United Kingdom, and India); R.A. Friedlander, Terrorism, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 846 (1999). 
45. Setty, supra note 42, at 10-11.
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through the lenses of drastically different cultures and legal 
traditions with particular emphasis on the scope of civilian impact 
anticipated by each applicable definition.  Thus, this analysis 
examines Western definitions of “terrorism” (i.e. the United 
States and the United Kingdom), South Asian definitions (i.e. 
India), Middle Eastern definitions (i.e. Iraq), and the prevailing 
universal definition (i.e. the United Nations). 
A. WESTERN PERSPECTIVES
The United States Code, relatively concisely, defines 
“international terrorism” as: 
[V]iolent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of
any State, or that would be a criminal violation if
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States
or of any State; [and] appear to be intended . . . to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence
the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
or to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping . . . .46
While this definition is relatively restrained, the United States 
only ranks thirty-second on the Global Terrorism Index of 
countries most likely to be affected by terrorism;47 a fact reflected 
by a restrained definition emphasizing small groups/sects within 
the general population (note the language: “a population” as 
opposed to “the population”).48  One legal commentator suggests 
this emphasis – absent significant losses of civilian life – is 
premised upon the belief that “the political goals of terrorists are 
often contrary to the vital interests of democratic countries, 
including the United States and its closest allies.”49  In other 
words, the United States’ definition of “terrorism” is largely 
46.  18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1)(A)-(B) (emphasis added).  Similarly, 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)
provides: “the term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”  
47. THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX: COUNTRIES MOST AFFECTED BY TERRORIST 
ATTACKS, World Atlas (Dec. 9, 2015), https:// www.worldatlas.com /articles /the- global- 
terrorism- index- countries- most- affected- by- terrorist-attacks.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y3XL-58EN]. 
48. Id. 
49. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 799 (Kermit L. Hall, et al. eds., 
2002). 
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informed by possible future threats to political goals, rather than 
as a response to civilian casualties. 
Whereas the United States Code largely defines terrorism by 
its impact on groups/sects within the population, on the surface, 
the United Kingdom emphasizes individual motivation over 
impact in that it encompasses both the population as a whole as 
well as groups/sects within the population.50  Specifically, the 
United Kingdom’s the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2000, 
provides in relevant part: 
‘[T]errorism’ means the use or threat of action 
where . . . the use or threat is designed to influence the 
government [or an international governmental 
organization] [sic] or to intimidate the public or section 
of the public, and the use or threat is made for the 
purpose of advancing a political, religious[, racial], or 
ideological cause.51 
However, the United Kingdom has also adopted a supplemental 
“catch all” provision – in which both motivation and scope of 
civilian impact are irrelevant – providing: “any violent act 
committed against another person where a firearm [or explosive 
device] is involved may be considered terrorism by the 
government . . . .”52  In other words, the United Kingdom has 
reserved the right to classify any event involving a firearm or 
explosive device as “terrorism” within its sole discretion.53  
Commentators suggest this liberal “catch all” provision may have 
been influenced by “numerous internal and external threats to 
[it’s] national security and emergency situations over many 
decades,”54 placing the United Kingdom thirty-fifth on the Global 
Terrorism index – well above the relative security of the United 
States and its definitional application.55 
50. Setty, supra note 42, at 31-45. 
51. TERRORISM ACT 2000, 2000 c. 11, Part 1, Section 1(1), http:// www. legislation.
gov.uk/ ukpga/ 2000/11/section/1 [https://perma.cc/WBU6-A2Q8]. 
52. Setty, supra note 42, at 33 (emphasis added).
53. Id. 
54. Setty, supra note 42, at 30; GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX, supra note 48.
55. GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX, supra note 48.
582 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  71:3 
B. EASTERN PERSPECTIVES
While the United Kingdom’s broad definition of “terrorism” 
(one that could be arbitrarily applied at the discretion of the 
government) has been influenced by numerous internal and 
external threats, it pales in comparison to the extraordinary broad 
language of India’s prevailing definition (also encompassing the 
population as a whole as well as groups/sect) originally codified 
in the Terrorist Affected Areas Act of 1984: 
‘Terrorist’ means a person who indulges in wanton 
killing of persons or in violence or in the disruption of 
services or means of communication essential to the 
community or in damaging property with a view to – 
putting the public or any section of the public in fear; 
or affecting adversely the harmony between different 
religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes 
or communities; or coercing or overawing the 
Government established by law; or endangering the 
sovereignty and integrity of [the Republic of] India . . . 
. 56  
In 2008, this definition was broadened even further to 
encompass any act “likely to cause” the type anticipated in 
the prevailing definition.57 
56. TERRORIST AFFECTED AREAS (SPECIAL COURTS) ACT, 1984, NO. 61, §2(1)(H)
ACT OF PARLIAMENT (1984) http://www.satp.org/ satporgtp/ countries/ india/ document/ 
actandordinances/ terroristaffectedact.htm [https://perma.cc/ACY7-G5X5 ] (emphasis 
added); Setty, supra note 42, at 48. 
57. Setty, supra note 42, at 53.  Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Ordinance provides: 
Whoever, with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of 
India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in 
any foreign country, does any act by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive 
substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or 
poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances 
(whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature, in such a manner as 
to cause, or likely to cause, death of, or injuries to any person or persons or 
loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies 
or services essential to the life of the community in India or in any foreign 
country or causes damage or destruction of any property or equipment used or 
intended to be used for the defence of India or in connection with any other 
purposes of the Government of India, any State Government or any of their 
agencies, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in 
order to compel the Government in India or the Government of a foreign 
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Legal commentators suggest the breadth of India’s definition 
may be even more susceptible to abusive or arbitrary application 
than the “catch all” provision of the United Kingdom’s definition; 
possibly including traditionally protected activities such as 
potentially offensive speech, protest, and assembly.58  For 
example, the publication of Hindu literature urging conversation 
among Muslims59 and Christians60 while advocating Hindu 
nationalism, could easily fall within the definition articulated in 
the Terrorist Affected Areas Act of 1984, if the publication is 
“likely” to “affect[ ] adversely the harmony” between the 
religious communities.61  While this prevailing definition is 
severe by Western standards, India ranks eighth on the Global 
Terrorism Index and has consistently “struggle[d] with issues 
concerning national security . . . since its independence in 
1947.”62  As a result, based upon its individual experiences, India 
has adopted one of the most broad, fluid definitions of “terrorism” 
in modern history that anticipating broad victimization.63 
Paradoxically, Iraq, first on the Global Terrorism Index,64 
has adopted a much more conservative definition of “terrorism” 
than India while defining the scope of civilian impact on the 
individual and group/sect levels.65  Specifically, Iraq’s Anti-
Terrorism Law defines “terrorism” as: 
country or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commits a 
terrorist act.  
THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ORDINANCE (2004), http:// www.satp.org/ 
satporgtp/countries/india/document/actandordinances/the_unlawful_activities__amendord2
004.htm [https://perma.cc/7LRA-6LGD].
58. See generally Setty, supra note 42.
59. 13.4% of the population. CENSUS OF INDIA: RELIGION, Office of the Registrar &
Census Commissioner (2011) http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/religion.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/UF6B-MSE8]. 
60. 2.3% of the population. Id. 
61. TERRORIST AFFECTED AREAS, supra note 57. Violent attacks on religious
minorities (i.e. Christians and Muslims) average approximately one per day. Colleen Curry, 
Christians and Muslims Face More Persecution by Hindu Extremists in India, Groups Say, 
VICE (Mar. 17, 2016) https://news.vice.com/article/christian-and-muslims-are-facing-
more-and-more-persecution-by-hindu-extremists-in-india [https://perma.cc/LDR2-Q2A4]. 
62. GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX, supra note 48; Setty, supra note 42, at 45.
63. Setty, supra note 42, at 45.
64. GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX, supra note 48.
65. Counsel of Ministers, Anti-Terrorism Law No. 13 of 2005 (Nov. 7, 2005) (on file
with author). 
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Every criminal act committed by an individual or an 
organized group that targeted an individual or a group 
of individuals or groups or official or unofficial 
institutions and caused damage to public or private 
properties, with the aim to disturb the peace, stability, 
and national unity or to bring about horror and fear 
among people and to create chaos to achieve terrorist 
goals.66 
However, despite the law’s predicate requirement of a “criminal 
act,” the definition has been heavily criticized by Shiite 
lawmakers who argue the law was created with too much Western 
influence (particularly by former occupying forces, such as the 
United States, that still retain a significant stake in Iraq’s 
legislative process).67  Specifically, following the United States 
led invasion in the Summer of 2003 until the withdrawal of the 
United States’ military presence in 2011, coalition forces were 
responsible for all governance as well as the creation and 
implementation of the post-withdrawal legislative structure.68  
However, many within Iraq’s post-coalition government, 
including Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak, suggest 
American influence was nonexistent at the time of Iraq’s Anti-
Terrorism Law;69 though this position largely seems untenable 
given the striking similarities between Iraq and the United States’ 
definition of “terrorism” (excepting its anticipated civilian 
impact).70 
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Iraqi Parliament Passes Anti-Terror Law, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 5, 2005), http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/ english/ doc/ 2005-10/ 05/ content_ 482721. htm 
[https://perma.cc/8ECB-DZ3V]; Iraq: A Broken Justice System: Ten Years After Invasion, 
Opponents Punished, Trial Rights Ignored, HUMANS RIGHTS WATCH (2010), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/31/iraq-broken-justice-system [https://perma.cc/RZ2F-
ET7X]  (noting claims that “officers and judges use the country’s anti-terrorism law to harass 
innocent civilians.”). 
68. See generally Katia Papagianni, State Building and Transitional Politics in Iraq:
The Perils of a Top-down Transition, 8 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES 253, 253–
71 (2007). 
69. See Ernesto Londoño, A Decade After Iraq Invasion, America’s Voice in Baghdad
Has Gone From a Boom to a Whimper, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2013), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/ world/ national-security/ a-decade-after-iraq-invasion-americas-
voice-in-baghdad-has-gone-from-a-boom-to-a-whimper/ 2013/ 03/ 23/2f334826-9303-
11e2-a31e-14700e2724e4_story.html [https://perma.cc/FJH6-G2QE]. 
70. Id. 
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D. THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
Not only have individual States struggled to uniformly 
define “terrorism” and its impact, but so too have international 
bodies.71  One of the first working international definitions of 
“terrorism” appears in Article 33 IV Geneva Convention of 1949, 
Article 51(2) Additional Protocol I of 1977, and Article 3 and 14 
Additional Protocol II of 1977 and anticipates the victimization 
applies to civilian populations as a whole (as opposed to 
individuals or groups/sects within the population): 
[I]ndicat[ing] an act of violence in breach of the
principles of military necessity, proportionality and
distinction, which is primarily aimed at spreading fear
among the civilian population. . . . contain[ing] the
same elements of the definition used in the common
language: the element of innocent victims (civilians), a
violent act and the existence of a political end which,
however, does not justify the means, because of their
disproportionality.72
Comparatively, “[o]ver the course of four decades, the 
international community, under the auspices of the United 
Nations, has developed 13 conventions [on] the prevention and 
suppression of terrorism.”73  Specifically, in 1994, the United 
Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 49/60 
(Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism) 
which expanded upon the Geneva Convention’s definition to 
include individuals, groups, and the population as a whole: 
‘[C]riminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a 
state of terror in the general public, a group of persons 
or particular persons for political purposes’ and that 
71. See generally BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010).
72. Roberta Arnold, The Prosecution of Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity, 64
ZAÖRV 979, 989 (2004), http://www.zaoerv.de/64_2004/64_2004_4_a_979_1000.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YFG4-UNSQ]. 
73. Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: Fact Sheet No. 32, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 13 (2008), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/48733ebc2.html [https://perma.cc/VJ27-UA8K] [hereinafter 
HCHR]. 
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such acts ‘are in any circumstances unjustifiable, 
whatever the considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or 
other nature that may be invoked to justify them.74 
Ten years later, in 2004, the United Nations Security Council 
again revisited the definition (without changing the scope of 
application), providing in Resolution 1566 (2004) “terrorism” 
includes: 
Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed 
with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, 
or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a 
state of terror in the general public or in a group of 
persons or particular persons, intimidate a population 
or compel a Government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.75 
However, that same year, the Secretary-General’s High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change scaled back the 
definition (i.e. the application to individuals) to: any act “intended 
to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or 
noncombatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or 
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government 
or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any 
act . . . .”76  Interestingly, both of the 2004 definitions are 
remarkably similar to the United States’ definition of “terrorism” 
codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1)(A)-(B) and 22 U.S.C. § 
2656f(d)(2) both in language and anticipated civilian impact.77 
As of 2016, the definitions articulated by the General 
Assembly in 1994, the Security Council in 2004, and the 
Secretariat in 2004 are the most current working international 
definitions of “terrorism.”78  However, since 2005, the Sixth 
Committee (Legal) of United Nations (“Sixth Committee”) has 
been drafting a comprehensive convention against terrorism 
74. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
75. Id (emphasis added).
76. Id (emphasis added).
77. See Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A)-(B) (2012); 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012).
78. Various Definitions of Terrorism, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY AND
MILITARY AFFAIRS, https:// dema.az.gov/ sites/ default/ files/ Publications/ AR-Terrorism 
%20Definitions-BORUNDA.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MV7-GPJ6]. 
2019  REDEFINING “CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY” 587 
designed to augment the existing legal regime on the topic.79  In 
its most current draft, the Committee defines the scope of 
“terrorism” as a group/sect within the general population: 
‘[U]nlawfully and intentionally’ causing, attempting or 
threatening to cause: ‘(a) death or serious bodily injury 
to any person; or (b) serious damage to public or private 
property, including a place of public use, a State or 
government facility, a public transportation system, an 
infrastructure facility or the environment; or (c) damage 
to property, places, facilities, or systems. . ., resulting or 
likely to result in major economic loss, when the 
purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or 
an international organization to do or abstain from 
doing any act.’80 
Yet, despite the Security Council’s recognition that the adoption 
of a universal anti-terrorism instrument, including a universal 
definition, as a “top priority,”81 debate over the proposed 
definition’s bearing upon liberations movements continues to 
stall its adoption.82  Specifically, the Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation (the second largest inter-governmental organization 
after the United Nations) has opposed and obstructed any 
definition that does not “distinguish between acts of terrorism and 
the legitimate struggle of peoples under foreign occupation and 
colonial or alien domination in the exercise of their right to self-
determination.”83  In response to these demands, the General 
Assembly has since “reaffirmed the right to self-determination 
and independence of all peoples [by upholding] the legitimacy of 
national liberation movements . . . [while] mak[ing] it clear that 
this does not legitimate the use of terrorism by those seeking to 
79. Agreed Definition of Term “Terrorism” Said to be Needed for Consensus on
Completing Comprehensive Convention Against It, UNITED NATIONS (Oct. 7, 2005), 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/gal3276.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/S7F3-FJ88]. 
80. HCHR, supra note 74, at 6.
81. Id. at 14. 
82. Id. at 6-7.
83. History, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION, https://www.oic-
oci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en [https://perma.cc/Z6SW-DS8K]; Rohan Perera, 
Oral Report of the Chairman of the Working Group on Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism, HUMANS RIGHTS VOICES (Nov. 13, 2015), http:// www.humanrightsvoices.org/ 
assets/ attachments/ documents/ 11.13.2015. Eliminate_ Intl_ 
terrorism_Chair_Wkg_Grp.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BG9-FYVG]. 
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achieve self-determination.”84  Thus, the adoption of a universal 
anti-terrorism instrument remains in legislative limbo. 
However, unfortunately, given the most current draft of the 
Sixth Committee, statutory definitions appear to be trending 
towards an anticipated impact upon groups/sects away from the 
Geneva Conventions’ recognition that even “targeted terrorism” 
against small groups affects populations as a whole.85  Thus, as a 
result, the final draft of the Sixth Committee must acknowledge 
the broad impact of even “targeted terrorism” in order to justify 
international jurisdiction. 
In the interim, there will be no prevailing, universal 
definition of “terrorism.”86  This void has been expressly 
condemned by the United Nations’ High Commissioner for 
Human Rights who notes: “[c]alls by the international community 
to combat terrorism, without defining the term, might be 
understood as leaving it to individual States to define what is 
meant by it.  This carries the potential for unintended human 
rights abuses,”87 including violations of internationally 
recognized norms in due process.88 
 THE SECOND CHALLENGE TO ICC 
JURISDICTION: DEFINING A “FAIR TRIAL” 
A. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS 
Despite the lack of a prevailing definition of “terrorism,” 
there is an international consensus that due process, including the 
right to a fair and impartial trial, predicating a criminal conviction 
is a fundamental human right.89  Specifically, 170 countries, 
84. HCHR, supra note 74, at 41.
85. Arnold, supra note 73, at 980.
86. Id.  However, some legal commentators argue that since our Geneva Conventions
of 1949 amount to customary law, the definition of “terror” under Article 33 IV GC could 
be used universally until the United Nations adopts a comprehensive convention on 
terrorism.  Id. 
87. HCHR, supra note 74, at 39.
88. Id. 
89. HCHR, supra note 74, at 38; Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A
Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers, OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL BAR 
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including the United States, have ratified the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), guaranteeing: 
“[a]ll persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the 
determination of any criminal charge against him . . . everyone 
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”90  In its 
official statutory comments to the ICCPR, the Human Rights 
Committee notes this requirement of impartiality is “an absolute 
right that is not subject to any exception.”91  Specifically, the 
Committee concludes: 
The notion of fair trial includes the guarantee of a fair [ 
] hearing.  Fairness of proceedings entails the absence 
of any direct or indirect influence, pressure or 
intimidation or intrusion from whatever side and for 
whatever motive.  A hearing is not fair if, for instance, 
the defendant in criminal proceedings is faced with the 
expression of a hostile attitude from the public or 
support for one party in the courtroom that is tolerated 
by the court, thereby impinging on the right to defence, 
or is exposed to other manifestations of hostility with 
similar effects.92 
To this end, the ICCPR mandates that the trier of fact “must not 
allow their judgement to be influenced by personal bias or 
prejudice, nor harbour preconceptions about the particular case 
before them, nor act in ways that improperly promote the interests 
of one of the parties to the detriment of the other” while 
ASSOCIATION 215, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training9chapter6en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2M6A-R779] (noting “[e]very person has the right to a fair trial both in 
civil and in criminal cases, and the effective protection of all human rights very much 
depends on the practical availability at all times of access to competent, independent and 
impartial courts of law which can, and will, administer justice fairly.”).  
90. Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard: International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS; OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, 
http:// indicators.ohchr.org/ (subject to several reservations); International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, Art. 14(1) (Mar. 23, 1976), http:// www.ohchr.org/ en/ 
professionalinterest/ pages/ccpr.aspx [https://perma.cc/H2R8-PX4H] (emphasis added).  
91. General Comment No. 32, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 5 (Jul.
27, 2007). 
92. Id. at 7-8.
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maintaining an outward appearance of the tribunal’s 
impartiality.93 
The language contained within the ICCPR (opened for 
signature in 1966) guaranteeing the right to a fair and impartial 
jury was largely derived from the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(“European Convention”) (opened for signature in 1950), 
providing: “[i]n the determination of . . . any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.”94  Since the European Convention served as 
the model for the ICCRP, cases and statutory interpretations 
arising under the European Convention are not only highly 
persuasive precedent, but also serve as a relatively accurate 
statement of the modern consensus on human rights.95  For 
instance, the European Court of Human Rights articulated the 
prevailing test for determining impartiality under the European 
Convention and the ICCPR.96 
Further, the European Convention was also the first 
instrument to give effect to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948) which recognized, for the first time, fundamental 
and inalienable rights for all humanity, including “a fair and 
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the 
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal 
charge against him.”97  In fact, this right of impartiality in the face 
of any criminal charge is so fundamental and non-derogable that 
most legal scholars regard it as forming part of customary 
93. Id. at 6. 
94. European Convention on Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUROPE 9, 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F86-EB2A]. 
95. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 29.
96. Nuala Mole & Catharina Harby, The Right to A Fair Trial: A Guide to the
Implementation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3 HUMAN 
RIGHTS HANDBOOKS 32 (Aug. 2006), http://www.refworld.org/ docid/ 49f180362.html 
[https://perma.cc/MX8C-HYRG ].  Id. at 33 (citing Fey v. Austria, 24 Feb. 1993, para. 30) 
(“[I]n deciding whether . . . there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular [court] lacks 
[independence or] impartiality, the standpoint of the accused is important but not decisive. 
What is determinant is whether this fear can be held to be objectively justified.”). 
97. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS 22 (Dec. 10, 1948), 
http:// www.un.org/ en/ udhrbook/ pdf/ udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/69L4-
75WQ] (emphasis added). 
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international law.98  As such, “[g]uaranteeing the right of terrorist 
suspects to a fair trial is critical for ensuring that anti-terrorism 
measures respect the rule of law” as well as preventing a 
derogation from a non-derogable right in violation of 
international custom.99 
B. OBFUSCATION OF THE ICCPR BY THE
UNITED STATES 
In furtherance of the ICCPR, as recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court, “[r]egardless of the heinousness of the 
crime charged, the apparent guilt of the offender, or the station in 
life which he occupies,’ our system of justice demands trials that 
are fair in both appearance and fact.”100  To this end, the federal 
constitution, proper venue lies within the state and district in 
which the alleged offense took place – something that is also 
recognized by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (“FRCP”) 18, 
providing “[u]nless statue or these rules permit otherwise, the 
government must prosecute an offense in a district where the 
offense was committed.”101  However, this requirement is not 
without limitation.  Instead, the Sixth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution trumps this venue provision by requiring the trial 
occur where “the jury guaranteed to the defendant [can] be 
impartial.”102  This too is reflected in the FRCP which provides 
“the court must transfer the proceeding against that defendant to 
another district if the court is satisfied that so great a prejudice 
against the defendant exists in the transferring district that the 
98. News and Events: Digital Record of the UDHR, HCHR (2009), http://
www.ohchr.org/ EN/ NEWSEVENTS/ Pages/ DigitalrecordoftheUDHR.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/UP22-7X8P]. As evidence of this custom, international humanitarian law 
provides largely identical protections, in the context of armed conflicts.  Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 16 (Feb. 
7, 2005). For instance, as codified in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 as 
well as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the denial of fair, regular, and 
impartial trial constitutes a war crime.  Rule 100. Fair Trial Guarantees, INT’L COMM. OF 
THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule100 
[https://perma.cc/SQ6R-RXSU]; ROME STATUTE Art. 8(1)(a)(vi). 
99. HCHR, supra note 74, at 38.
100. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 29 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. 5; 14. 
101. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18. See U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 3; amend. VI.
102. Forty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 42 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. 
CRIM. PROC. 597 (2013). 
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defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial there.”103  In 
other words, where an unfair prejudice exists, a court must 
relinquish jurisdiction in favor of another, non-prejudiced venue. 
Specifically, the FRCP even prevailed in terrorism cases.  
For instance, in the 1995 trial of Timothy McVeigh, whose 
bombing of an Oklahoma City, Oklahoma federal building 
resulted in 684 injured and 167 dead  (19 of whom were babies or 
young children) was still guided by the ICCPR compliant FRCP, 
even though at the time, it was considered the worst terrorist 
attack in the country’s history.104  Specifically, United States 
courts followed standard procedure in granting105 McVeigh’s 
motion for a change of venue: 
An accused need not establish the existence of a lynch 
mob atmosphere to merit a change of venue: . . . ‘When 
a spectacular crime had aroused community attention 
and a suspect has been arrested, the possibility of an 
unfair trial may originate in widespread publicity 
describing facts, statements and circumstances which 
tend to create a belief in his guilt’106  
Further, as noted in McVeigh’s accomplice’s motion for a change 
of venue: 
Here, neither time nor close inquiry will erase the 
physical, psychological, emotional, and economic 
103. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a) (emphasis added).  These constitutional and statutory
requirements have historically been relied upon by defendants where the nature of the 
charges and the scope of the publicity has “tainted” the jury pool in a given district – 
including in cases of terrorism.  For instance, in the McVeigh trial, District Court Judge 
Matsch, without hesitation or reservation, ordered a change of venue from the Western 
District of Oklahoma to the District of Colorado because “[t]he effects of the explosion on 
that community [were] so profound and pervasive that no detailed discussion of the evidence 
[was] necessary. . . . The prejudice that may deny a fair trial is not limited to a bias or 
discriminatory attitude. It includes an impairment of the deliberative process of deductive 
reasoning from evidentiary facts resulting from an attribution to something not included in 
the evidence. That something has its most powerful effect if it generates strong emotional 
responses and fits into a pattern of normative values.”  United States v. McVeigh, 918 
F.Supp. 1467, 1470-72 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
104. See Sheryll Shariat, et al., Oklahoma City Bombing Injuries, OKLA. STATE DEP’T 
OF HEALTH (Dec. 1998), https://www.ok.gov/ health2/ documents/ OKC_Bombing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YA24-FYNM]. See also Oklahoma City Bombing, HISTORY.COM, http:// 
www.history.com/ topics/ oklahoma- city- bombing [https://perma.cc/6Q85-CWGN]. 
105. McVeigh, 918 F.Supp. at 1469.
106. Brief in Support of Motion to Transfer, United States v. McVeigh, CR 95-110-A
(1995) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)) (citing People v. Williams, 774 
P.2d 146, 155 (1989)).
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effects of the bombing on the citizens of Oklahoma. 
These tangible connections intensify and are only 
intensified by the effects of massive, highly prejudicial 
pretrial publicity upon the citizens of Oklahoma. The 
people of Oklahoma are exposed to this publicity not as 
disinterested individuals, but as people who themselves 
have been victimized by the bombing and who identify 
themselves closely with those who are suffering from 
the loss or injury of a loved one and with those who are 
attempting to recover from the damage or destruction 
of their home or business. Based on the combined 
effects of pervasive, inflammatory, and incriminating 
publicity [] along with the special interest that 
Oklahomans have in the outcome of [the] trial . . . .107 
However, a decade following McVeigh’s trial, the United States 
was again attacked, with bombs at the finish line of the Boston 
Marathon Bombing (discussed above); the end result of which 
would be an obfuscation of the line drawn by the ICCPR and the 
FRCP and a refusal to change venue even despite evidence of 
overwhelming prejudice.108  Specifically, the two-to-one majority 
in In Re Tsarnev noted: 
It is true that there has been ongoing media coverage of 
the advent of the trial and petitioner’s pre-trial motions, 
both locally and nationally. But that would be true 
wherever trial is held, and the reporting has largely been 
factual. These factors persuade us that petitioner has not 
demonstrated a clear and indisputable right to relief 
based on a presumption of prejudice from pretrial 
publicity.109 
Therefore, the First Circuit Court refused to comply with the 
ICCPR and the FRCP in what the dissent called “trial-by-media 
and raw emotion” that ensured the Defendant would not receive 
“a fair trial [or be] accorded the utmost due process.”110 
107.  See Motion for Change of Venue and Supporting Brief, United States v. McVeigh,
http:// www.goextranet.net/ Seminars/ Ohio/ Thurschwell/ Pretrial/ Venue.htm 
[https://perma.cc/CD3X-4M8L]. 
108. See United States v. Tsarnaev, 157 F.Supp. 3d 57, 59 & n.1 (D. Mass. 2016).
109. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d 14, 22 (1st Cir. 2015).
110. Id. at 50 (Tourella, J., dissenting).
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C. TERRORISM’S COLLECTIVE IMPACT UPON
“FAIRNESS” 
The United States’ seeming shift away from the ICCRP and 
FRCP may likely be the result of bias resulting from continued 
“third party victimization,” brought about by the 24-hour-news-
cycle’s collective coverage of terrorism attacks and threats to 
Americans.111  Specifically, as noted above,112 within four days 
following the first bomb blast, most people in the United States 
had engaged with at least one news report regarding the bombing 
via some form of media source; this fact was even recognized by 
the majority in In Re Tsarnev who noted “the events here, like the 
1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the September 11, 
2001 attacks, received national and international attention.  
Petitioner does not deny that a jury anywhere in the country will 
have been exposed to some level of media attention.”113 
To this end, studies suggest “[m]edia coverage of collective 
traumas may trigger psychological distress in individuals outside 
the directly affected community.”114  Specifically, as noted above, 
engagement with media coverage during a terrorist attack or a 
mass-shooting may: (1) cause acute stress symptoms greater than 
those who were at or near the actual attack; (2) trigger flashbacks 
to different attacks or the same attack later in life; (3) encourage 
subconscious fear conditioning; and (4) result in chronic stress 
about the event from repeated exposure.115  Thus, anyone with a 
television connection can become a “third party victim” and 
suffer trauma – including lasting psychological effects such as 
PTSD, depression, anxiety, etc. – as a result of watching coverage 
associated with a terrorist act.116  Therefore, in accordance with 
111. See E. Alison Holman, et al., Media’s Role in Broadcasting Acute Stress
Following the Boston Marathon Bombings, 111 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 93, 93 (2013). 
112. See supra note 20.
113. In Re Tsarnev, 780 F.3d at 16.
114. Holman, supra note 112.
115. U.C. Irvine, Prolonged Viewing of Boston Marathon Bombings Media Coverage
Tied to Acute Stress (Dec. 9, 2013), https:// news.uci.edu/ press-releases/ prolonged-viewing- 
of- boston- marathon- bombings- media- coverage- tied- to- acute- stress/ 
[https://perma.cc/D8VL-LUYD]. 
116. See Holman, supra note 112, at 93.  Specifically, as noted in one study following
the Boston Marathon Bombing: 
[M]edia exposure in the week after the bombings was associated with higher 
acute stress than direct exposure to the bombings . . . Repeatedly engaging 
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traditional due process interpretations, such “third party victims” 
should be rendered ineligible for jury service.117 
Importantly, these observations are not just limited to the 
attacks on the Boston Marathon, instead, similar effects were 
perceived following the terrorist attacks of: the Oklahoma City 
Bombing,118 September 11, 2001119 and the Sandy Hook School 
shooting.120  Thus, the effects of wide-spread “third party 
victimization” appear whenever there is a terrorist attack or other 
instance of wide-spread manmade violence.121  In explaining this 
phenomenon, some psychologists hypothesize: 
Repeatedly watching disturbing images may also affect 
threat appraisals and may contribute to stress-related 
symptoms. Because rumination keeps the mind focused 
on a past negative event, media exposure may 
perpetuate activation of fear circuitry in the brain, 
especially in the early aftermath of the event when 
memory consolidation is most pronounced; this could 
contribute to the abnormal consolidation of fear 
conditioning that is associated with development of 
acute and PTS responses. Unlike direct exposure to a 
collective trauma, which can end when the acute phase 
with trauma-related media content for several hours daily shortly after 
collective trauma may prolong acute stress experiences and promote 
substantial stress-related symptomatology. Mass media may become a conduit 
that spreads negative consequences of community trauma beyond directly 
affected communities. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
117. See generally Oregon State Bar, Handbook for Jurors, https:// www.osbar.org/
public/ jurorhandbook.htm [https://perma.cc/7NE9-JNL4] (noting victims have “actual 
bias” in adjudications of their alleged offender). 
118. Pfefferbaum B, et al., Television Exposure in Children after a Terrorist Incident,
64 PSYCHIATRY, 202, 207–09 (2001). 
119. Jennifer Ahern, et al., Television Images and Psychological Symptoms After the
September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 65 PSYCHIATRY 2002, 289–300 (2002).  Participants “who 
repeatedly saw ‘people falling or jumping from the towers of the World Trade Center’ [on 
television] had higher prevalence of PTSD . . . and depression . . . than those who did not.” 
Id.  Another study found that “[f]orty-four percent of the adults reported one or more 
substantial symptoms of stress; 90 percent had one or more symptoms to at least some 
degree. Respondents throughout the country reported stress symptoms.”  Mark A. Schuster, 
et al. A National Survey of Stress Reactions After the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks, 
345 N ENGL J MED. 1507, 1507 (2001). 
120. See Holman, supra note 112, at 94.
121. See id. 
596 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  71:3 
of the event is over, media exposure keeps the acute 
stressor active and alive in one’s mind.122 
To this end, “[g]iven the significance of media in our daily 
lives, its impact on our health is likely to grow,” including the 
bias it produces.123  As a result, as terrorist attacks continue, it is 
likely that: (1) more States will turn a “blind eye” to the dictates 
of the ICCRP as a matter of judicial policy governing terrorism 
trials, and (2) populations (and jury pools) will become 
increasingly “de facto prejudiced” by the effects of media 
coverage and the “third party victimization” it causes.124  
Therefore, in compliance with the ICCRP, proper venue must lie 
with an independent, unaffected body – the International Criminal 
Court. 
THE SOLUTION PART I: 
REDEFINING “CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY” TO 
PERMIT ICC JURISDICTION OVER TERRORISM 
ADJUDICATIONS 
In 1872, International Committee of the Red Cross co-
founder, Gustav Moynier, first proposed a permanent 
international court to adjudicate crimes committed during the 
Franco-Prussian war.125  Moynier’s proposal went largely 
overlooked until 1919, when the drafters of the Treaty of 
Versailles, unsuccessfully called for the creation of an 
international court to adjudicate war crimes committed during the 
First World War.126  While Moynier’s proposal was laudable, it 
could not overcome concerns of state sovereignty.127  Instead, it 
would take nearly seventy-five years until Moynier’s proposal 




125. History of the ICC, COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., http:// archive.iccnow.org/
?mod= icchistory [https://perma.cc/5MEZ-GTEF]. 
126. Id. 
127. André Durand, Gustav Moynier and the Peace Societies, 314 INT.L REV. OF THE
RED CROSS (Oct. 31, 1996), https:// www.icrc.org/ eng/ resources/ documents/ article/ other/ 
57jnaw.htm [https://perma.cc/4YZE-CJB7]. 
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Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals following the Second World 
War.128 
Following the Second World War and the resulting Tokyo 
and Nuremburg ad hoc international tribunals, the United Nations 
was established in 1945 in part, to prevent future, similar 
atrocities.129  Within one year of its creation, the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which “called for criminals 
to be tried ‘by such international penal tribunal[s] as may have 
jurisdiction’ . . . [and] invited the International Law Commission 
‘to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an 
international judicial organ for the trials of persons charged with 
genocide.’”130  However, these efforts were largely abandoned in 
the 1950’s in response to the Cold War, despite near agreement 
on an “International Code of Crimes.”131 
Following the end of the Cold War, in 1989, the United 
Nations General Assembly requested the International Law 
Commission to resume the creation of an international 
adjudicatory organ.132  The need for such a body was underscored, 
within a matter of years, in which the United Nations Security 
Council was forced to establish separate ad hoc tribunals in 
response to conflicts in Bosnia, Croatia, and Rwanda.133  As a 
result of this pressure, in 1994, the International Law Commission 
presented a drafted statute calling for the creation of the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”).134  After years of debate 
and revision, on July 17, 1998, representatives from 160 member 
nations convened in Rome to vote on the adoption of the ICC.135  
As a result, over 125 years after Moynier’s first proposal, the 
128.  Christian Tomuschat, The Legacy of Nuremberg, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 830, 830, 
832 & n. 7 (2006). 
129. Id. at 837.
130. U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(1999), http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm [https://perma.cc/N3QM-GH42]
(quotations omitted); U.N. Treaty Series, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide at 282–83 (1951), https:// treaties.un.org/ doc/ publication/ unts/
volume%2078/ volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZM8-BZPR]; See History
of the ICC, supra note 126.
131. See History of the ICC, supra note 126.
132. See U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, supra note 131.
133. See History of the ICC, supra note 126.
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
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Rome Statute was adopted with 120 nations voting in favor, 7 
nations voting against (including the United States, Israel, China, 
Iraq, and Qatar), and 21 nations abstaining.136  Upon reaching its 
ratification threshold, the Rome Statute entered into force on July 
1, 2002 and investigations into crimes within the limited 
jurisdiction of the Court began almost immediately.137 
A. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE
ICC138 
In addition to establishing the ICC, the Rome Statute also 
codified the applicable criminal law within the court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction.139  Specifically, Article 5 of the Rome Statute 
limits the jurisdiction of the Court “to the most serious crimes of 
concern to the internal community as a whole,”140 including: 
genocide (i.e. murder, causing seriously bodily harm, etc. “with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group”);141 crimes against humanity (i.e. murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, 
rape, etc. “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population”);142 and war crimes (i.e. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. This discussion is limited to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction in that the
United States is not a party to the Rome Statute, thus the ICC does not retain subject matter 
jurisdiction unless “the crime took place on the territory of a State Party or a State otherwise 
accepting the jurisdiction of the Court, the United Nations Security Council has referred the 
situation to the Prosecutor, irrespective of the nationality of the accused or the location of 
the crime,” or the United States accepts jurisdiction of the court.  See How the Court Works, 
supra note 38.  Thus, while a territorial jurisdiction analysis may render this analysis moot, 
these alternatives to territorial jurisdiction—however unlikely—provide a path for the 
subject matter jurisdiction analysis to proceed. 
139. See ROME STATUTE, supra note 38, at Art. 5.
140. Id. at Art. 5(1).
141. ROME STATUTE, supra note 38, at Art. 6(a)-(e). “[A]lthough the negotiators of
the Rome Statute contemplated adding many crimes to the Court’s jurisdiction including 
terrorism, drug trafficking, hostage-taking, and aggression, it was ultimately decided that it 
would be preferable to begin with universal ‘core crimes’ defined in treaties or found in 
customary international law . . . .” Leila Sadat, The International Criminal Court, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 137, 145 (William A. 
Schabas ed., 2016). 
142. ROME STATUTE, supra note 38, at Art. 7(1)(a)-(k).
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grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 such as willful 
killing, torture, deprivation of a fair and regular trial, taking 
hostages, etc. committed “against persons or property protected 
under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention” as part 
of a plan, policy, or large-scale commission).143  However, 
despite the fact terrorism, in its contemporary practice, “is always 
and everywhere in violation of international law,”144 the Rome 
Statute does not explicitly grant the Court jurisdiction over acts 
of terrorism nor does it define the term (see definitional 
discussion above).145  As such, the Court may only prosecute 
terrorist acts if they fall within the elements of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, or war crimes as enumerated in the Rome 
Statute.146 
To that end, as early as the 1919, the Commission of the 
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement 
of Penalties, terrorism has been incorporated within the definition 
of “crimes against humanity.”147  In 1945, the Nuremberg Trials 
became the first to adjudicate the “crime against humanity of 
‘systematic terrorism,’”148 specifically, in rendering its verdict, 
the International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) found: 
With regard to crimes against humanity, there is no 
doubt whatever that political opponents were murdered 
in Germany before the war, and that many of them were 
kept in concentration camps [(deemed by the tribunal 
as a terrorist tool to implement a policy of crimes 
143. Id. at Art. 8(1)-(2)(a)(viii).  Article 5 of the Rome Statute also anticipates the
Court will acquire jurisdiction over “the crime of aggression” in the future.  Id. at Art. 
5(1)(d)-(2).  While the Assembly of States Parties have agreed that “a ‘crime of aggression’ 
means the planning, preparation, initiation[,] or execution [of an act] [(i.e. invasion, military 
occupation, annexation, etc.)] us[ing] [] armed force[s] by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity[,] or political independence of another State,” the Court may not begin 
exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the crime until after January 1, 2017 when the 
Amendment must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the States Parties to the Rome 
Statue and ratified by at least 30 States Parties.  Id. at Art. 11(1)-(2); Handbook: Ratification 
and Implementation of the Kampala Amendments to the Rome Statute of the ICC, GLOBAL 
INSTITUTE FOR THE PREVENTION OF AGGRESSION (June 2012), 
https://crimeofaggression.info/documents /1/handbook.pdf. 
144. Darren C. Zook, “Terrorism,” in 4 The Oxford International Encyclopedia of
Peace 145, 145 (Nigel J. Young ed., 2010). 
145. Cf. How The Court Works, supra note 38.
146. ROME STATUTE, supra note 38, at Art. 5.
147. Arnold, supra note 73, at 987-88. 
148. Id. at 980-81. 
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against humanity)] in circumstances of great horror and 
cruelty. The policy of terror was certainly carried out on 
a vast scale, and in many cases was organised and 
systematic.149 
Thus, the IMT held that terrorist acts, in order to be considered a 
crime against humanity, the act(s) “are characterised by either 
their seriousness and their savagery, or by their magnitude, or by 
the circumstance that they were part of a system of terrorist acts, 
or that they were a link in a deliberately pursued policy against 
certain groups of the population.”150  In other words, IMT 
jurisprudence unequivocally established that terrorism falls 
within the definition of “crimes against humanity” under the 
customary law when the alleged offense is: (1) particularly savage 
or serious, (2) large in scale, (3) part of a series of attacks, or (4) 
committed with discriminatory purpose.151 
More recently, in Prosecutor v. Galic (2003), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”) convicted a defendant for the war crime of terror 
against the civilian population in Sarajevo based upon the 
precedential foundation of the Nuremburg Trials.152  However, 
Galic, with respect to its war crimes analysis, represented a 
significant deviation from ICTY jurisprudence in which, 
generally, “[t]he Trial Chambers characterises . . . the crime[ ] of 
terror . . . as constituting crimes against humanity, that is, 
persecution and inhumane acts” under explicit holding of the 
IMT.153 
However, the IMT and ICTY iterations of the international 
customary law were not explicitly codified in the Rome Statute.154  
Instead, during the Rome Conference, “several delegations 
argued for the inclusion of terrorism in the jurisdiction of the 
Court as a separate crime,” but a majority of States disagreed 
149. Id. at 989 (quoting Judgement: The Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, YALE LAW SCHOOL: THE AVALON PROJECT (2008), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judlawre.asp [https://perma.cc/ZF93-NWRZ]. 
150. Niemann, supra note 42, at 176 (quoting Special Court of Cessation in the
Netherlands (Apr. 11, 1949), Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (1949) No 435, 747). 
151. See id. 
152. See HCHR, supra note 74, at 14-15. 
153. Arnold, supra note 73, at 990; Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-39,
Judgment, 607 (August 2, 2001). 
154. Compare Arnold, supra note 73, at 990-91 with ROME STATUTE, supra note 38,
at Art. 5(1). 
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because of the lack of a commonly agreed upon definition (see 
above).155  As a result, the Rome Statute does not currently 
include “terrorism” as a separate crime, yet an attack may still 
constitute a crime against humanity within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC only if it is committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population.156  However, this 
jurisdictional hook is significantly more limited that that 
originally articulated by the IMT, specifically: terrorism falls 
within the definition of “crimes against humanity” when it is 
particularly savage or serious, large in scale, part of a series of 
attacks, or committed with discriminatory purpose.157 
B. PROPOSED STATUTORY REVISIONS TO
“CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY”
The limited jurisdictional hook of the ICC over acts of 
terrorism falling within the definition of “crimes against 
humanity” is predicated upon Article 7(1) of the Rome Statue, 
necessitating the enumerated crimes be “committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population.”158  According to the statute’s interpretive language, 
this requires “the multiple commission of acts . . . against any 
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organizational policy to commit such attack.”159  While this 
continuality and organizational requirement, is arguably 
applicable to liberation or ideocentric organizations such Irish 
Republican Army, Islam State of Iraq and Greater Syria, and Al-
Qaeda,160 it seemingly would not apply to non-organized actors 
such as Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev (even though their acts 
would have likely fallen within the IMT’s interpretation of crimes 
against humanity). 
As such, to effectuate the precedent established by the IMT 
and expand the ICC jurisdiction to include terrorism within the 
155. HCHR, supra note 74, at 14.
156. Id. at 14-15. 
157. See Niemann, supra note 42, at 176.
158. ROME STATUTE, supra note 38, at Art. 7(1).
159. Id. at Art. 7(2)(a).
160. Country Reports on Terrorism, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE: OFFICE OF THE 
COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM (April 30, 2007), https://www.state.gov/j/ 
ct/rls/crt/2006/82738.htm [https://perma.cc/3WEF-43ZK]. 
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meaning of “crimes against humanity,” the operative language 
articulated in Article 7(1), should be amended: 
From: “For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against 
humanity’ means any of the following acts when 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population . . . .”161 
To: “For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against 
humanity’ means any of the following acts when 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directedly against any civilian population . . . .” 
Further, the interpretive language, articulated in Article 
7(2)(a), should be amended 
From: “the multiple commission of acts . . . against any 
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a 
State or organizational policy to commit such 
attack . . . .”162 
To: the multiple commission of any acts . . . against any 
civilian population, or pursuant to or in furtherance of 
a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.” 
These revisions would not only give effect to the broad 
interpretation established by IMT (while retaining 
complementarity), but also avoid the controversy associated with 
explicitly defining “terrorism” in the Statute. 
THE SOLUTION PART II: 
DECLINING “COMPLIMENTARY JURISDICTION” 
OVER TERRORISM ADJUDICATIONS 
The preamble of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”) codifies international 
customary law, providing “it is the duty of every State to exercise 
its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes . . . .”163  However, Article I of the Rome Statute also 
establishes the ICC as a permanent institution with “the power to 
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes 
161. ROME STATUTE, supra note 38, at Art. 7(1).
162. Id. at Art. 7(2)(a).
163. Id. at Preamble.
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of international concern . . . .”164  To avoid any resulting 
jurisdictional conflicts, the ICC’s jurisdiction is subject to 
limitation.  Specifically: 
The [ICC] may exercise jurisdiction if [t]he accused is 
a national of a State Party or a State otherwise accepting 
the jurisdiction of the Court; [t]he crime took place on 
the territory of a State party or a State otherwise 
accepting jurisdiction of the Court; or [t]he United 
Nations Security Council has referred the situation to 
the Prosecutor, irrespective of the nationality of the 
accused or the location of the crime.165 
Even when the court may exercise jurisdiction, it may decline to 
exercise its power based on the “principle of 
complementarity.”166  Under this principle, the Court will decline 
jurisdiction over a case if it “has been or is being investigated or 
prosecuted by a State with jurisdiction.”167  However, this 
exception is limited if the “prosecuting State is unwilling or 
unable to genuinely [ ] carry out the investigation or 
prosecution.”168  As such, despite being able to assert jurisdiction, 
the ICC will decline jurisdiction if a State with complementary 
jurisdiction has or is, in the largely subjective judgment of the 
Court, “legitimate” investigation or prosecution individuals 
charged with genocide, crimes against humanity, or war 
crimes.169 
Not only is such a policy not in keeping with the wide-spread 
effects of terrorism, which renders a “genuinely” fair trial nearly 
impossible at the State-level, but abolishing the ICC’s recognition 
of complimentary jurisdiction in terrorism prosecutions is of 
164. Id. at Art. 1.
165. How the Court Works, supra note 38.  Specifically, under the Rome Statute, the
ICC retains jurisdiction over “those directly responsible for committing the crimes as well 
as others who may be liable for the crimes, for example by aiding, abetting or otherwise 
assisting in the commission of a crime.  The latter group also includes military commanders 
or other superiors whose responsibility is defined in the Statute.” International Crimes and 
Accountability: A Beginner’s Introduction to the Duty to Investigate, Prosecute and Punish, 
DIAKONIA (October 2013), https://www.diakonia.se/ globalassets/ documents/ ihl/ihl-
resources-center/international-crimes-and-accountability-a-beginners-introduction-to-the-
duty-to-investigate-prosecute-and-punish.pdf [https://perma.cc/NPC5-LYGM]. 
166. International Crimes and Accountability, supra note 166.
167. Id. 
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Id. 
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paramount importance now that most states, with the exception of 
Germany, have largely abandoned the controversial concept of 
“universal jurisdiction,” in which, largely as a matter of 
custom,170 a third-party country can “try and punish perpetrators 
of some crimes so heinous that they amount to crimes against the 
whole of humanity, regardless of where they occurred or the 
nationality of the victim or perpetrator.”171 
A. THE RISE OF “UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION”
“Although almost two-thirds of all states have national 
legislation permitting their courts to exercise universal 
jurisdiction over certain conduct committed abroad amounting to 
one or more of the following crimes: war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide, torture, extrajudicial executions or 
‘disappearances,’”172 very few States have taken action under 
their respective statutory grants.173  However, in 2002, Germany 
began asserting jurisdiction over international cases involving at 
least some German connection – be it as a victim, offender, or a 
third party affected by genocide, war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity.174 
In many respects, German “universal jurisdiction,” was 
predicated upon Spain’s historical allowance for its national 
courts (Audiencia Nacional) to pursue criminal cases outside of 
its territorial jurisdiction since 1985.175  Pursuant to Organic Law 
6/1985 on the Judiciary (Ley Organica del Pder Judicial) Article 
23 § 4, Spanish Criminal Courts could assert jurisdiction over 
170. See Rule 157. States Have the Right to Vest Universal Jurisdiction in Their
National Courts over War Crimes, INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter44_rule157 
[https://perma.cc/64XW-6XNX]. 
171. Questions and Answers on the ICC and Universal Jurisdiction, AMERICAN NGO
COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ 
ugd/e13974_eb835efd38ac47e4917bbf7f283e4564.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WA8-CEBJ]. 
172. Universal Jurisdiction: The Duty to Enact and Enforce Jurisdiction, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL (Sept. 2001), https:// www.amnesty.org/ download/ Documents/ 128000/ 
ior530172001en.pdf [https://perma.cc/478R-S3SC]. 
173. Id. 
174. Helen Zuber, Universal Jurisdiction? Spain’s ‘World Court’ May Be Restricted,
SPIEGEL INTERNATIONAL (June 2, 2009), http://www.spiegel.de/ international/ world/ 
universal- jurisdiction- spain- s- world- court- may- be- restricted- a-628112.html 
[https://perma.cc/FB33-MCSQ]. 
175. Id. 
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“offenses of an international nature or with an international 
dimension.”176  This provision was broadly conceived to provide 
Spanish courts with “absolute jurisdiction, no links with Spain 
were required and no criteria of subsidiarity applied; furthermore, 
anybody could file a claim.”177  Spain justified this unparalleled 
jurisdiction as a “necessity” following the Nuremberg Trials in 
which a “general consensus [] formed . . . that acts of horror 
should [not] go unpunished, especially when they [cannot] be 
prosecuted in the country where they occurred.”178 
In the years following the enactment of Organic Law 6/1985, 
Spain opened several investigations into international offenses – 
most notably against former Chilean dictator General Augusto 
Pinochet.179  Spain’s investigation into Pinochet began in 1996 
when a non-governmental organization – the Spanish Union of 
Progressive Prosecutors – filed a complaint in the Spanish courts 
“accusing members of the Argentine military . . . of genocide, 
terrorism, and other crimes . . . .”180  Despite several requests 
from judges, Chile refused to extradite Pinochet or make him 
available for questioning – causing the case to stall.181  However, 
the case regained new life when Pinochet, then age 82, traveled 
to London for medical care in 1997.182 
Pinochet’s arrival in London for medical care sparked a 
year-long diplomatic and legal battle, which ultimately 
culminated in Pinochet’s arrest in October 1998 at London Bridge 
Hospital on an Interpol Red Notice alleging the commission of 
numerous international atrocities between 1973 and 1983.183  
However, following Pinochet’s arrest, the Chilean government 
176. Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, art. 23(4) (Spain).
177. Rosa Ana Alija Fernandez, The 2014 Reform of Universal Jurisdiction in Spain
From All to Nothing, 9 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 717, 
717 (2014). 
178. Zuber, supra note 175.
179. Daniel Del Pino, Spain, Universal Judge, PUBLIC (June 5, 2009),
http://www.publico.es/internacional/espana-juez-universal.html [https://perma.cc/KE35-
3KXP] (citation based on English translation). 
180. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 311, 311 (2001). 
181. David Connett et al., Pinochet Arrested in London, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 
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sought to enjoin Pinochet’s extradition to Spain asserting 
Pinochet was traveling on a diplomatic passport and subject to 
diplomatic immunity.184  After a legal battle that ultimately 
reached the House of Lords twice, English court’s held,  
following pressures from the United Sates and then Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher (who was a close, personal friend of 
Pinochet) that: (1) Pinochet was not entitled to diplomatic 
immunity because certain international crimes allowed for a 
piercing of the “diplomatic veil”; and (2) Pinochet could only be 
extradited for crime committed after 1988 – the year which the 
United Kingdom recognized the UN Convention Against 
torture.185  Since the arrest warrant was for alleged violations of 
international law between 1973 and 1983, the United Kingdom 
could not hold or extradite Pinochet to Spain.186  As such, 
Pinochet was ultimately released and returned to Chile a free man. 
B. THE FALL OF “UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION”
In the years following the Pinochet debacle, despite dozens 
of on-going investigation and some successful prosecutions, 
international pressure eventually forced Spain to reduce the scope 
of Organic Law 6/1985.187  The first limitation of Organic Law 
6/1985 was imposed in October 2005 by Spain’s Constitutional 
Court decided that Spain’s criminal courts could not maintain 
“absolute” jurisdiction, but could maintain “universal 
jurisdiction” in which “judges in Madrid had a duty to pursue 
breaches of international agreements – like the Geneva 
Convention on handling prisoners of war, or treaties against 
184. Id. 
185. The Extradition of General Augusto Pinochet, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 14, 
1999), https://www.hrw.org/news/1999/10/14/extradition-general-augusto-pinochet 
[https://perma.cc/U7EC-HDGA]. Interestingly, the House of Lords did not address nor did 
the Chilean government raise the issue of Spain’s ex post facto application of Organic Law 
6/1985.  Id. Specifically, Interpol’s warrant sought Pinochet’s extradition to Spain for crimes 
occurring between 1973 and 1983 – two years prior to Spain’s adoption of Organic Law 
6/1985.  Connett et al., supra note 182.  Instead, the decision to not extradite was predicated 
on the ex post facto application of UK law.  
186. Andrea Gattini, Pinochet Cases, OXFORD PUB. INT. LAW (June 2007),
http://opil.ouplaw.com/ view/ 10.1093/ law:epil/ 9780199231690/ law-9780199231690-
e859 [https://perma.cc/SJ5J-BUMM]. 
187. Soeren Kern, Spain Rethinks Universal Jursidiction, GATESTONE INSTITUTE
(Jan. 31, 2014), https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4149/spain-universal-jurisdiction 
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genocide or torture – which Spain had signed[;] [however,] [a]ll 
the justices had to determine was that no other court in the world 
was already trying the same crime.”188  In so doing, Spain adopted 
a “principle of complementarity” which was nearly identical to 
that of the ICC. Yet, despite this limitation, prosecutions 
continued largely unhindered until 2009.189 
In 2009, a Spanish court sparked international backlash 
when it announced several high-profile investigations into the 
activities of Israeli and United States nationals.190  Specifically, 
in January 2009, Spanish Judge Fernando Andreu announced the 
investigation into seven top Israeli military and government 
official for crimes against humanity.191  In March of that year 
Judge Baltasar Garzon announced the investigation of six former 
Bush administration officials for facilitating torture at the 
Guantanamo Bay detention center.192  Finally, in May 2009, 
Judge Santiago Pedraz announced formal charges against three 
United State soldiers for crimes against humanity relating to the 
shelling of a Baghdad hotel.193  A diplomatic fight then ensued, 
led by the United States, in which, ultimately, the Spanish 
Congress of Deputies and the Spanish Senate voted to restrict 
Organic Law 6/1985.194 
As the first major legislative amendment of Organic Law 
6/1985, Organic Law 1/2009, provided several significant 
limitations on the country’s “universal jurisdiction.”195  
Specifically, Spanish courts could only exercise of jurisdiction if: 
(1) the alleged perpetrator was within the territorial jurisdiction
of Spain, (2) the case involve Spanish victims - including those of
Spanish descent, or (3) there was some other relevant link
connecting the offense/case to Spain.196  While the third
provision, was somewhat vague, “[s]uch relevant link has
been . . . described as historical, social, cultural, legal, political,
and other similar relations (belonging in the past to the same
188. Zuber, supra note 175.
189. Id. 
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political unit, sharing a common language with relevant cultural 
nexus, participating in political international organisations [sic] 
that must be analysed [sic] on a case-by-case basis.”197  As a result 
of Organic Law 1/2009, which applied to pending cases as well 
as future cases, the cases involving United States and Israeli 
nationals were summarily dismissed.198 
Within the limitations imposed by Organic Law 1/2009, 
Spanish courts still continued opening dozens of high-profile 
investigations involving international law.199  In October 2013, 
Spain again shocked the international community when Spanish 
High Court Judge Ismael Moreno accepted a case filed by the 
Madrid-domiciled Tibetan Support Committee and the 
Barcelona-domiciled Tibet House Fund and found sufficient 
evidence to issue arrest warrants for former Chinese President 
Jiang Semin, former Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng, and three 
other high-ranking Chinese officials.200  Under the arrest warrants 
which claimed the parties “aimed at eliminating the uniqueness 
and existence of Tibet as a country, imposing martial law, 
carrying out forced deportations, mass sterilization campaigns 
and torture of dissidents,” the official could be arrested when 
traveling to any country with which Spain has an extradition 
treaty.201  In response to the arrest warrants, the Chinese 
parliament officially condemned the action and urged Spain to 
“face up to China’s solemn position, change the wrong decision, 
repair the severe damage, and refrain from sending wrong signals 
to the Tibetan independences forces, and hurting China-Spain 
relations.”202 
Almost immediately following China’s condemnation, 
Spanish lawmakers responded to avoid an international incident 
and economic reprisals.203  Specifically, lawmakers sought to 
avoid damaging its trade relationship with China – which is 
Spain’s biggest trading partner outside of the EU and is the 
second largest holder of Spanish debt – in the same way that 
Norway did “after the Norwegian Nobel Committee in 2010 
197. Id. at fn. 5.
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awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, a dissident serving 
an 11-year prison term in China.”204  In response, Spanish 
lawmakers drafted, presented, and passed Organic Law 1/2014 
within two months.205  Spanish law now provides that that the 
country’s criminal courts may only assert jurisdiction when: 
[I]n cases of genocide, crimes against humanity or war
crimes, . . . the alleged perpetrator [must] be a Spanish
national, a foreigner who habitually resides in Spain or
a foreigner who happens to be in Spain and whom the
Spanish authorities have refused to extradite . . . . for 
crimes of torture and enforced disappearance if the 
alleged perpetrator is a Spanish citizen or, the victim is 
a Spanish citizen at the time the act was committed and 
the alleged perpetrator is on Spanish territory [, and] for 
crimes not covered by the law itself, Spain shall respect 
the rules of jurisdiction provided by treaties to which it 
is a party.206 
Further, the revised law prevents non-victim third parties, such as 
the Tibetan Support Committee and the Tibet House Fund, from 
filing cases before Spanish criminal courts.207  In essence, 
Organic Law 1/2014 stripped Spain of its “universal jurisdiction,” 
implicitly deferring instead to the use of “universal jurisdiction” 
by other States or the ICC.208 
C. THE REMAINING JURISDICTIONAL VOID
With the collapse of “universal jurisdiction” resulting from 
Organic Law 1/2014, and the exception of German efforts, the 
ICC stands alone in its ability to provide a neutral, third-party 
adjudication of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, 
the crime of aggression, etc.209  However, its ability to hear such 
204. Id. 
205. Fernandez, supra note 178, at 718.
206. International Committee of the Red Cross, Organic Law 1/2014 Modifying the
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cases is significantly curtailed by “principle of complementarity” 
which requires a subject judgment of whether a State-party “is 
“unwilling or unable” to genuinely carry out the investigation or 
prosecution.”210  As a result, if “crimes against humanity” is 
redefined to include terrorism (as proposed above), the Court’s 
jurisdiction will be a subjective determination, much like that in 
In Re Tsarnaev.211  Therefore, as the only remaining viable third-
party adjudicator, the Court must de facto decline to abide by the 
“complimentary jurisdiction” rule in cases of terrorism as no 
target-state is “able to genuinely carryout the investigation or 
prosecution” in keeping with the Court’s charge to abide by “the 
principles of due process recognized by international law.”212 
CONCLUSION 
As discussed in this analysis, there is no universally accepted 
definition of “terrorism,” nor is there agreement upon the scope 
of terrorism’s civilian impact (i.e. individuals, groups/sects, 
and/or the population as a whole).  Unfortunately, many States, 
including the United States and Iraq, as well as the Sixth 
Committee of the United Nations, appear to be trending away 
from statutory schemes embracing the Geneva Conventions’ 
recognition that even “targeted terrorism” affects the population 
of a State as a whole; a fact supported by emerging data on 
secondary victimization in the age of the twenty-four-hour news 
cycle.  Further, prevailing social science data concludes that not 
only does terrorism result in widespread secondary victimization, 
but it also cultivates significant anti-defendant bias among the 
population.  As a result, the fundamental right to a fair and 
impartial trial in cases of terrorism is becoming increasingly 
impossible to realize, especially within a target country (as 
exemplified by the trial of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev in the United 
States).  Thus, given the lack of “universal jurisdiction” 
alternatives, international tribunals – primarily the ICC – must be 
empowered to assume subject-matter jurisdiction through the 
210. How the Court Works, supra note 38.
211. Id. 
212. ROME STATUTE, supra note 38, at Art. 17 § 1(a), 2; see supra Part I and Part II.
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expansion of existing, codified jurisdictional “hooks,” such as 
“crimes against humanity,” while retaining internationally 
accepted norms of “due process.” 
